When should the U.S. fight?

There is a big difference between supplying materiel to Ukraine and going into combat for Taiwan.

Republicans are trending toward abandoning U.S. assistance to Ukraine in its fight against the Russian invasion.

Meanwhile, the odds of the United States going to war with China over Taiwan are supposedly steadily increasing.

One argument in favor of continued aid to Ukraine is that it deters China from attempting to militarily capture Taiwan. I’m in favor of continuing U.S. assistance to Ukraine, but that’s a shaky rationale. Putin’s experience in Ukraine will probably cause Xi to more carefully examine claims by his military regarding its capabilities. But the United States giving materiel to Ukraine is a far different proposition than entering into actual combat on behalf of Taiwan. Whatever happens in Ukraine probably won’t materially change Xi’s evaluation of the likelihood of the U.S. joining the battle and the consequences of that.

Currently, the U.S. is rootless regarding international geopolitics and our diplomatic and military role and strategy. Part of this is the scattershot and transactional conduct of foreign policy during the Trump administration. But part of it, and the more important part, is the failure to find strategic grounding for the world as it currently is.

During the Cold War, the United States was generally guided by a policy of containment regarding Soviet communism. In the post Cold War period, the United States was the guarantor of an international, rules-based order. The 9/11 attacks shifted the focus to protecting the country against Islamic terrorism and eradicating it wherever it took root, which led to massive overreaches in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

I think President Biden is mostly correct when he says that the geopolitical challenge of our time is democracy vs. authoritarianism, although I would modify that to say democratic capitalism, since market economies are a vital part of the difference. With the formal alliance between Russia and China, we are living in the world Robert Kagan anticipated 15 years ago in his prescient book, The Return of History. 

This isn’t, or shouldn’t be, the Cold War redux. The world shouldn’t become a global chess board, as it was during the Cold War. Russia and China want to reshape the world order to make it safe and affirming for their forms of authoritarianism. But not seek to spread them evangelically, as the expansionist Soviet Union did. 

The first step in a grounded U.S. response should be in the realm of economics, creating a free trade zone among fellow democracies with market economies. Containment didn’t really end the Cold War. The inability of the Soviet Union to keep pace with the American economy did. The same will ultimately be true of China. Over the next couple of decades, China will become a stagnant economic force, hamstrung by demography and the throttling of the Chinese economy by Xi Thought. 

We aren’t off to a good start on this first step. Although Biden is correct regarding the challenge, his fraudulently named Inflation Reduction Act is packed with industrial policy and protectionism – which will limit prosperity in the democratic zone, our chief long-term advantage over authoritarianism, particularly as allies emulate it.

A military posture and strategy is much more complex and difficult. But Ukraine and Taiwan offer instructive reference points in thinking about it. 

It’s worth noting that U.S. and European assistance to Ukraine didn’t really begin to flow until after the Ukrainians had withstood and repulsed the initial invasion. And not until after President Zelensky’s inspiring leadership offered convincing, and moving, testimony regarding the country’s commitment to its sovereignty and to joining the zone of democracy in Europe. If Putin’s initial blitzkrieg had been successful, the U.S. and Europe would have imposed some sanctions and learned to live with Putin remaking the map of Europe by force.

The Ukrainians aren’t asking anyone to fight for them. They are only asking for the materiel to enable them to fight. Thwarting or containing Putin’s remaking of the map of Europe by force is in the strategic interest of the United States, particularly since we are obligated by the NATO treaty to come to the defense of other countries that might be coveted by Putin. 

Moreover, the cost to the United States, in the provision of materiel, is commensurate with our strategic interests at stake.

Hard to say the same thing about going to war over Taiwan. It is a highly admirable polity, having made a successful transition from dictatorship to democracy. It has a robust economy and plays a crucial role in the supply chain for computer chips. And it is strategically located.

There is a law requiring the U.S. to supply Taiwan with defensive weapons. But the United States has maintained a policy of strategic ambiguity regarding whether we would enter into battle if China attempted to incorporate Taiwan militarily. This was thought to be a sweet spot to deter China without provoking it. 

There have been public war games released regarding what would happen if the United States and Japan intervened to prevent a military takeover of Taiwan. The results are pretty similar. The invasion is repulsed. But the island of Taiwan is decimated and all militaries suffer tens of thousands of casualties. 

That’s a cost that exceeds our strategic interest in an independent Taiwan. Moreover, I doubt the conclusion that the U.S. would prevail. Such war games can’t factor in the will to fight. If it comes to war, taking over Taiwan will be more important to China than keeping it independent, particularly if decimated, will be to the United States. The will to fight is what turned the tide of war in Ukraine.

Strategic ambiguity may have lulled the Taiwanese into a false state of reliance. Taiwan has not done enough to prepare to defend itself. By this point, it should be the Israel of the Asia-Pacific. It is not.

I’m not sure that China will go to war to incorporate Taiwan. It was able to incorporate Hong Kong without destroying it. What would be the point of incorporating a decimated Taiwan? I suspect that Taiwan has many more years to exist in its current legal limbo, as a result of Chinese self-interest, not a U.S. deterrent. 

What are the lessons from all this? A rooted U.S. response to the revisionism of the authoritarian alliance would be grounded in economics. That’s the field on which the authoritarians can’t compete or keep up. 

The U.S. should be willing to provide materiel to democracies to defend themselves against authoritarian threats, as we are doing in Ukraine. But we should be much more circumspect about offering, or seeming to offer, security guarantees. They can overextend us and give other democracies a false sense of reliance, reducing what they do to protect themselves.  

Reach Robb at robtrobb@gmail.com.