Thinking through Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan
Paradoxically, where the case for U.S. action is the strongest, Ukraine, domestic political support is the weakest.
President Joe Biden had been criticized for not making the case to the American people why assisting Ukraine in staving off forcible absorption by Russia is an actionable strategic interest of the United States.
Hamas’s terrorist attack on Israel, and Israel’s response of declaring full-out war on Hamas, forced Biden’s hand. And, apparently, gave him what he regards as an opportunity to do some old-fashioned legislative logrolling.
Biden gave a speech to the nation making his case for U.S. assistance to the military campaigns of both Ukraine and Israel. Additional assistance to Taiwan wasn’t included in the speech, but was part of the supplemental appropriation his administration subsequently requested to put some meat on the speech’s bones.
Unfortunately, the case Biden made was rooted in an outdated and unconvincing view of the role of the United States in the world. To exaggerate a bit, but only a bit, Biden’s case was that the United States has to assume these burdens because no one else will:
American leadership is what holds the world together. American alliances are what keep us, America, safe. American values are what make us a partner that other nations want to work with. To put all that at risk if we walk away from Ukraine, if we turn our backs on Israel, it’s just not worth it .…What would happen if we walked away? We are the essential nation.
Biden even invoked Madeleine Albright’s unfortunate description of the United States as “the indispensable nation”.
In the early days of the Cold War, the United States was the indispensable nation in checking Soviet expansionism and the spread of Soviet-led communism. But the rise of other developed democracies should make that no longer the case. The population and economic resources of democratic Europe dwarf those of Russia. The population and economic resources of the developed democracies in the Asian Pacific – such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia – should, properly marshaled, be sufficient to check China’s hegemonic ambitions, particularly if supplemented by a developing India.
Being the indispensable nation doesn’t serve the strategic interests of the United States, carefully considered. It frequently involves us in regional conflicts where the costs aren’t proportional to our true strategic interests at stake.
Moreover, that’s a role for the United States in world affairs that isn’t domestically sustainable. The American people are tired of being asked to carry a disproportionate burden for peace and security elsewhere. The appeal to continue the early Cold War role of the United States in world affairs increasingly falls flat, both domestically and internationally.
Instead, there needs to be a clear-eyed consideration of the proportionality of what the United States is being asked to do and the narrowly-defined strategic interests we have in the outcome.
Paradoxically, where that proportionality most clearly registers in favor of action is in Ukraine, which has the least domestic political support of these three hot spots.
Putin wants Russian expansionism to the maximum extent possible to restore the Soviet empire. After the invasion of Ukraine, there should be no doubt or debate about this.
If successful in Ukraine, where Putin would turn next would likely involve former Soviet satellites now part of NATO, and to whom the United States has a treaty obligation to support militarily if attacked. There can be arguments as to whether the NATO expansion was wise or foolish. But it is a fact, as is the U.S. treaty obligation.
The United States, therefore, has a huge strategic interest in seeing Putin bogged down in Ukraine and his military apparatus degraded. The Ukrainians aren’t asking the United States to join the fighting, just to help equip them to do it. All it costs us is money and some logistical maneuvering. The proportionality of what we are being asked and our true strategic interest at stake tilts overwhelmingly to helping the Ukrainians continue the fight.
There’s another strategic reason to continue assisting Ukraine. Putin’s invasion has awakened European democracies to the need to do more to provide for their own security. This can be an important step toward a reduced burden for the United States in the region longer term.
Some critics of continued Ukrainian assistance on the right pooh-pooh the European contribution. This is extraordinarily myopic. European democracies risked significant harm to their economies by cutting off Russian gas supplies. They have generously accepted Ukrainian refugees. They are supplying Ukraine with what weapons they can, often with enhanced lethality in advance of what the Biden administration has been willing to provide. Moreover, there are serious efforts underway to increase the ability to produce munitions on the continent.
There’s a third strategic reason to help the Ukrainians stay in the fight. Putin’s massive miscalculation could serve as a deterrent to a Chinese military attempt to absorb Taiwan. War doesn’t always go the way you think, even when you have an overwhelming advantage on paper.
The proportionality calculation for the United States is far different for Israel and Taiwan.
I think Biden is mostly right that the geopolitical conflict of our time is between democracy and authoritarianism. The United States has a strategic interest in seeing small democracies such as Israel and Taiwan survive. We should be willing to sell them the military hardware they need to defend themselves. And in Israel's case, defending itself includes degrading to the extent possible Hamas’s capabilities in Gaza.
However, the proportionality calculation tilts away from direct military involvement by the United States in either situation.
I have frequently called the Middle East a geopolitical snakepit. The United States has tried for over a half century to manage the snakes. We have failed comprehensively and spectacularly.
The Biden administration is still trying to manage the snakes. It has moved significant military assets into the region, supposedly to deter the expansion of the conflict by Hezbollah or Iran.
But what if the deterrence doesn’t work? Are we going to take military action directly? If so, that’s an involvement hugely disproportionate to our true strategic interests. And if not, the risk of having our bluff called is also hugely disproportionate to our true strategic interests.
War simulations show huge casualties if the United States attempts to thwart a Chinese military takeover of Taiwan. The geography alone suggests a strong likelihood that China would prevail. The United States has followed a policy of strategic ambiguity about whether we would deploy militarily to protect Taiwan in the event of an attempted takeover, again supposedly as a deterrent.
This may be a disservice to the people of Taiwan. The United States is highly unlikely to go to war with China over Taiwan. Taiwan needs to be turning itself into a difficult-to-digest military porcupine. Holding out the potential of an American rescue impedes the domestic consensus and commitment to make it so.
The supplemental appropriation requested by the Biden administration clocks in at $105 billion. It’s a classic attempt at legislative logrolling.
The hope is that aid to Ukraine can be politically carried over the finish line by the more popular aid to Israel. The package includes border security, humanitarian assistance, development aid, and beefing up Indo-Pacific defenses. The gambit is to pick up China hawks and give Democrats a political defense against Republican attacks on illegal immigration.
A supplemental appropriation evades whatever budget caps exist. It also ducks the balancing of competing priorities in the regular appropriations process – if Congress ever has one, or even some ad hoc alternative to one. Supplementals should be used sparingly, not expansively like this.
The only things deserving of a quickly passed supplemental would be continuing to supply Ukraine and Israel with munitions and restocking American supplies of the same. That could probably be done at half the price of the Biden supplemental. Everything else should be folded into whatever overall budget process eventually emerges.
The United States is far behind in rethinking its role in the world given the rise of other developed democracies and the geopolitical challenge from the authoritarian alliance. The world is not waiting for us to catch up.
Reach Robb at robtrobb@gmail.com.