The Political Notebook: Mesnard edition
A wrong Prop. 123 political analysis, single-member state House districts, and parity for independents on the redistricting commission.
I had intended this to be a typical notebook column, shorter observations about disparate topics. However, after identifying ideas banging around the Arizona Legislature that I found interesting, I noted a common element: they were all the handiwork of state Sen. J.D. Mesnard.
Mesnard has been one of the most serious and productive legislators over the last decade and a half. He was a chief architect of the flat tax and universal voucher program that are the GOP’s signature accomplishments over this stretch.
There is much to laud regarding Mesnard’s legislative activity, and I will do some lauding as we move along. However, I have to begin with this: I think his political assessment about a Proposition 123 renewal is seriously flawed.
Proposition 123 was passed by Arizona voters in 2016. It increased the distribution from the state land trust for K-12 schools from 2.5% to 6.9%, producing, roughly, an additional $300 million a year. The referendum settled a lawsuit that was pending over the Legislature having skipped a couple of inflation adjustments to what the schools get from the general fund.
The higher distribution expired last June. The Legislature has been unproductively churning over a replacement ever since. The land trust distribution is set in the state constitution, so renewing a higher distribution has to go back to voters.
Mesnard has been a leader in a GOP faction that wants all of an increased distribution to go to teacher salaries. In the original iteration, the additional money went to public schools generally on a per-pupil basis, to be used as they thought best.
In an interview with the Arizona Mirror, Mesnard pointed to the narrow passage of the original Prop. 123 as a reason not to simply revive the per-pupil approach. Voters would be more likely to approve it, Mesnard opined, if the money went to something specific they supported, like increased teacher salaries.
Mesnard has some policy reasons for supporting the teacher salary earmark. But his political analysis about the difficulty of passing a revived per-pupil distribution overlooks historical context. There were two significant political crosscurrents that made the 2016 vote so close that wouldn’t exist, or would be significantly diminished, in a Prop. 123 redux.
In 2016, there was a strong claim, including by the then current state treasurer and a previous one, that the higher distribution would erode the trust’s principal. That proved to be wildly off the mark. The trust’s investment return exceeded the higher distribution throughout and the trust’s principal, far from being eroded, massively increased. It’s now unarguable that the 2.5% distribution cheats existing students, and by a lot. A similar claim about a higher distribution damaging the trust’s future wouldn’t carry nearly the same weight in a vote on a Prop. 123 redux.
The other political crosscurrent was general, and hardened, opposition from elected Democrats. Former Gov. Doug Ducey negotiated Prop. 123 with the education groups litigating the inflation funding dispute. Although education groups – representing teachers, school administrators, and school board members – supported Prop. 123, the tug of anti-Duceyism proved stronger among partisan Democrats. Irrational anti-Duceyism was the major reason for the closeness of the 2016 vote. Today, a bipartisan higher distribution on a per-pupil basis would not generate the same reflexive partisan opposition.
Gov. Katie Hobbs has proposed that a slice of the higher distribution go to support bonds for capital repairs to district schools. If that would settle a new lawsuit over such funding, it would be something GOP legislators should seriously consider.
Other than that, a per-pupil distribution is more in keeping with the school choice model Republicans profess to support, leaving schools to compete for students based upon how they use the money, rather than dictating a particular use of it. It is probably the surest route to a bipartisan referral and bipartisan support in the election. And the pitch to voters would be straightforward: we’ve had this, it worked well, so let’s continue it.
Another Mesnard idea is to expand the state House from 60 members to 90 and have them elected in single-member districts. The measure (Senate Concurrent Resolution 1022) passed the Senate largely along party lines.
Mesnard seems to think the expansion is the most important provision, since he has also proposed increasing the number of supervisors in large counties. However, I think the most important provision is the single-member districts.
Arizona’s bicameral legislative structure is a bit odd. The state is divided into 30 legislative districts, the same ones for both the Senate and the House. Voters elect one state senator from each district and two House members. In the election, voters cast one vote for state senator but two votes for House members.
The two-member per district structure dilutes democratic accountability and leads to partisan gamesmanship, something railbirds call a “single-shot”. If a political party is at a disadvantage in a particular district, it will sometimes run only a single candidate for the House rather than two, to concentrate its partisan support in hopes of also gaining slippage from the weaker candidate of the majority party. Democrats have been more successful at this maneuver than Republicans.
Because of physical limitations in the current House building, Mesnard’s proposal wouldn’t implement the expansion and single-member reform until after redistricting in 2040. However, leaving the House at 60 members but converting them to 60 single-member districts could be done in the 2030 redistricting.
Single-member House districts would be a gain for democratic accountability. There’s no reason to wait an additional decade for it.
The last Mesnard reform (for this column; he’s a fountain of interesting ideas) is probably the most compelling and important, even more than a Prop. 123 successor. Mesnard would expand the independent redistricting commission from five (two Democrats, two Republicans, and an independent) to nine (three Democrats, three Republicans, and three independents). This would also require voter approval.
The expansion would better reflect the distribution of political affiliation in the state, with independents given parity with the two major political parties. Mesnard would increase the approval threshold for new congressional and legislative maps from a simple majority of the five current commissioners to an extraordinary majority of six of the nine reform commissioners. That would promote greater consensus building and reduce the ability of one of the parties to ram through a favorable map.
In the current configuration, the sole independent serves as chairperson for the commission. If the independent chairperson leans toward one of the parties, that’s game over. And both parties believe that past chairpersons have leaned against them in previous redistrictings. Under the Mesnard reform, if the parties are split on the map, it would require unanimity among the independent commissioners to prevail. Chances are there would be more constructive give-and-take along the way to avoid getting to that partisan standoff.
This very valuable reform (SCR 1023) passed the Senate but Democrats opposed it. Some of them expressed opposition to another provision narrowing the allowable population differential between districts, arguing that could make it more difficult to create minority-influenced districts.
I think Mesnard is right about narrowing the allowable population differential. However, expanding the commission and giving parity to independents is a much more important and beneficial provision. If there are changes that preserve that heart of the reform but make support bipartisan, Mesnard would serve the state well by shepherding it to the ballot.
Reach Robb at robtrobb@gmail.com.