A constructive and sustainable role for the U.S. in the world
A possible new, bipartisan consensus out of the shambles of Trump's war on Iran and his foreign policy generally.
Out of the shambles of Donald Trump’s war on Iran and his foreign policy generally, there is a narrow opening for a constructive and sustainable role for the United States in the world.
That is not a likely post-Trump development. But it is a possible one, from either a Democrat or Republican successor. Indeed, there is the prospect of a new, bipartisan foreign policy consensus that the country hasn’t really had since the fall of the Soviet Union.
Such a foreign policy would be re-rooted in American values.
The Trump administration has gone out of its way to disassociate itself from any notion of a values-based foreign policy. Instead, in speeches and reports, the stress is on a forceful assertion of raw national interest, a return to the great power geopolitics of the 19th Century.
That this would be the self-proclaimed foreign policy of the United States on the 250th anniversary of its Declaration of Independence is a tragic irony. That declaration was grounded in values – individual freedom and democratic governance – asseverated as universal. Trump’s great power geopolitics is a betrayal of our founding.
However, even as declaring an abandonment of a values-based foreign policy, the Trump administration is still, apparently unwittingly, at least partially in service to its precepts.
One of the tenets of the Trump administration is that our allies need to do more to provide for the collective defense, particularly in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
And who are our allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific? They are countries with market economies and democratic governance. And who is the collective security designed to protect against? Russia and China, two large, repressive autocracies.
Even in Trump’s foreign policy, at least so far and in most of the world, allies are those who share our values and possible foes are those who do not.
In terms of a values-based foreign policy, I’ve long thought that the formulation based on an address by John Quincy Adams well captured what should be the default position: America is a friend of freedom everywhere, but a custodian only of our own. (What Adams actually said was less lapidary, but the shorthand is faithful to the original.)
With the responsibilities the United States has assumed for collective security in the post-World War II world, returning to the purely non-interventionist role envisioned by Adams, and George Washington before him, isn’t practical. And would probably be unwise.
However, the country should become much more circumspect about where and how it intervenes.
The Ukraine-Russia conflict offers useful lessons and guidance. Initially, the United States was largely providing the weapons Ukraine needed for its defense. This gave the U.S. a role disproportionate to our true strategic interest in the conflict, which Trump initially used to try to compel Ukrainian concessions other European democracies regarded as destabilizing and dangerous.
After the Trump administration cut off the flow of aid to Ukraine, other European democracies stepped up to buy the weapons from the U.S. to give to Ukraine. This, combined with domestic drone innovation and creativity, kept Ukraine in the fight, averted the destabilizing and dangerous concessions, and even appears to have turned the tide of the war against Russia.
Where the respective roles of the U.S. and European democracies ended up could have been where it started. Ukraine is democratically governed and aspires to join the European Union, which will require rule-of-law improvements. Putin is a repressive thug who wants to expand his influence over other countries against the will of their peoples.
In a values-based but circumspect foreign policy, the United States should be willing to permit Europeans to buy U.S. military weapons on behalf of Ukraine and leave resolution of the conflict to the battlefield and European diplomacy.
Being FDR’s arsenal of democracy would be an appropriate role in a values-based but circumspect foreign policy. That could become the U.S. role in a European-led and manned NATO. And a reduced role for the United States in the Indo-Pacific. Since our democratic allies are mostly rich and can pay for what they are buying, it would be profitable for American defense companies and no drain on U.S. taxpayers.
A values-based but circumspect foreign policy would eschew regime change operations and be much more cognizant of the humanitarian costs of our interventions. Nothing in the post-World War II history is clearer than that the United States doesn’t have the capacity or ken to engage in regime change without a substantial risk of making a hash of it. We should not be falsely raising the hopes of aspiring democrats of decisive U.S. assistance. Our interventions, aimed at regime change if not openly admitted, have further immiserated the lives of Iranians and Cubans.
A values-based but circumspect foreign policy would not ignore or eschew relations with autocratic regimes. But these would be transactional relationships. We wouldn’t confuse even friendly autocracies with allies that share our values.
The largest change from this insight would be in the Middle East. We should be willing to be an arsenal of democracy for Israel, but its fights shouldn’t be our own – the fundamental strategic flaw in Trump’s war on Iran. In the larger geopolitical competition for regional influence, there is no reason for the United States to prefer Sunni autocrats to Shia ones. To the maximum extent possible, we should extricate ourselves from the snake pit of Middle Eastern geopolitics. Another clear lesson from the post-World War II history is that we aren’t very good at navigating that snake pit.
There are some tough consequences to a new values-based but circumspect foreign policy. The most consequential would be in the Indo-Pacific. We would not go to war with China over Taiwan. Or over contested islands with Japan. Indo-Pacific democracies would have to be much better prepared to deter China on their own, or make accommodations with it. In many respects, this would just be a recognition of a reality that already exists.
In Europe, the Ukrainian conflict has exposed the Russian military as a hollow and corrupt force. The Baltic countries remain in danger of Russian influence operations. But, in general, Europe probably has the time for an orderly transition of NATO into a European-led and manned security alliance.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, U.S. foreign policy, particularly military engagements, has frequently been at odds with domestic public opinion, or fell out of favor over time. A values-based but circumspect foreign policy could sustain public support. There would be broad support, or at least acceptance, of a foreign policy consisting primarily of helping fellow democracies stay on the cutting edge of military technology, eschewing regime change operations, and transactional relations with autocracies that didn’t include security guarantees.
Such a constructive and sustainable foreign policy would also help rebuild the soft power Trump’s blunderbuss foreign policy has destroyed.
As I say, there is a narrow opening to such a foreign policy in a post-Trump presidency. I don’t expect it. But the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence is a time for some hope for a rededication to its principles.
Reach Robb at robtrobb@gmail.com.